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SOVEREIGN DEBT GOVERNANCE, LEGITIMACY, AND
THE SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT GOALS;
EXAMINING THE PRINCIPLES ON RESPONSIBLE
SOVEREIGN LENDING AND BORROWING
Marie Sudreau† & Juan Pablo Bohoslavsky†
Abstract: In the context of the Sustainable Development Goals (“SDGs”)
negotiation, this article questions to what extent legitimacy matters in sovereign debt
governance and, if so, under what conditions. How can one recognize legitimate
governance instruments when informality of governance process and practice is regarded
as an important goal? This article sees the implementation of SDGs in the global
financial arena as facilitated by legitimate normative instruments that reflect general
public interest and demonstrate respect for human rights. The implementation of
informal norms should give rise to substantive outcomes that are both sustainable and
legitimate, thereby complementing the procedural dimension of any normative instrument.
This article evaluates this assumption by reviewing the development and implementation
of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development’s Principles on
Responsible Sovereign Lending and Borrowing. We conclude that legitimacy is not only
a key component in the construction of well-grounded informal laws, but also forms part
of a desirable legal framework for the implementation of SDGs.

I.

INTRODUCTION

Sovereign debt governance is an important field in the realm of
sustainable development, yet states have not formally agreed to bind
themselves to rules ensuring a sustainable global financial path. In the
preparation of the post-2015 Development Agenda and the Third
International Conference on Financing for Development to be held in July
2015 in Addis Ababa, the international community faces reconciling the
imperatives of sovereign states that need financing to provide the conditions
necessary for the well-being of their citizens with the purely profit-oriented
imperatives of financial markets. At the same time, these markets provide
financial space for sovereign borrowers with rapid, albeit risky, development
perspectives. This reconciliatory exercise amounts to a search for legitimacy
in sovereign debt governance.
†

Marie Sudreau is Sovereign Debt Expert at UNCTAD. The authors wish to extend their gratitude
for the comments to the drafts of this paper received from Jean d'Aspremont. The views and conclusions
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Legitimacy—which is when rules have moral force because of their
lawfulness 1 —is a concept generally associated with identity, interest, and
practice, or with an institution’s norms, rules, and principles. Like all
concepts meant to express an objective reality, legitimacy is the fruit of a
balancing act between subjective financial interests and a general interest in
human rights. 2 This balancing act, frequently expressed in considerations
linked with sustainability, ultimately leads to a compromise that is
acceptable to societal stakeholders.
The question of legitimacy in sovereign debt governance is relevant
not only in relation to the authorities responsible for regulating this field but
also to the normative instruments that are used for this purpose. This article
does not focus on the intrinsic quality of authorities but rather on what they
produce and how,3 thereby implying a reflection on norm properties rather
than institutional legitimizing mechanisms. This methodological decision is
grounded in the determination that the definition of international authority
and related acceptance, especially in regard to debt issues, goes well beyond
the definition of state actors. Currently, international authorities are defined
more by their production than by their classical legal definition. In practice,
many of the international public authorities making financial decisions with
worldwide impact would not pass any Westphalian test.
Having defined the scope of this article within those boundaries, one
would be in a position to assess the legitimacy of financial decisions made
by lenders and borrowers, irrespective of their type of governments. The
same question can be answered according to the criteria of input and output
legitimacy, regardless of the actor. Under this framework, Saddam Hussein
could have made exceptionally legitimate decisions when he channeled
international funds towards the needs of his population,4 while some of the
loans taken—for example, by a democratic European state and its lenders—
could be considered illegitimate in light of the recent events in the eurozone
and their impact on the population. As the above discussion indicates, any
legitimacy assessment is complex and involves procedural and substantive
components that can be deeply entwined.
This article questions the relevance and understanding of legitimacy
as applied to informal normative initiatives in sovereign debt governance,
1

BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1040 (10th ed. 2014).
See SIMONE PETER, PUBLIC INTEREST AND COMMON GOOD IN INTERNATIONAL LAW ( 2012).
3
See, e.g., Jean D’Aspremont & Eric De Brabandère, The Complementary Faces of Legitimacy in
International Law: The Legitimacy of Origin and the Legitimacy of Exercise, 34 FORDHAM
INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL 101, 101 (2010).
4
See U.N. Human Rights Council, Report on Financial Complicity: Lending to States Engaged in
Gross Human Rights Violations, 28th Sess., Mar. 2-27, 2015, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/28/59 (Dec. 22, 2014).
2
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which will ultimately facilitate the Sustainable Development Goals
(“SDGs”). In doing so, this article attempts to include the widest range of
possible options in reviewing elements that could give rise to legitimacy in
this context. It argues that in addition to the procedural (ex ante) dimension
of legitimacy, substantive outcomes stemming from the implementation of
informal norms also constitute an important dimension of norm legitimacy
in sovereign debt governance.
This, in turn, should facilitate the
achievement of the SDGs. The promotion of macro-economic and financial
sustainability is embedded in the realization of substantive outcomes. This
latter component of normative legitimacy makes well-grounded informal
norms central to the development of responsible financial practices in the
field of sovereign debt. This article looks to how this practice manifested in
the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (“UNCTAD”)
Principles on Responsible Sovereign Lending and Borrowing 5 (“the
Principles”)—a specific and informal normative initiative in sovereign debt
governance—and whether this makes any difference in terms of
effectiveness and actual acceptance by relevant stakeholders in sovereign
debt governance.
The scope of this article is limited to assessing the legitimacy of
informal norms like the Principles in the field of sovereign debt governance.
This assessment occurs while acknowledging that international finance
dynamics are impacted by distributive tensions, there is a large space in
which non-cooperative or abusive behavior is possible and even foreseeable,
and an international treaty in this area is not realistic in the short- and midterm. Yet even under these constraints, seeking procedural and substantive
legitimacy through informal legal instruments could contribute to feasible,
agreeable, and well-grounded rules in sovereign debt governance aimed at
achieving the SDGs.
Part II of this article provides context on the relationship between
sovereign debt governance, legitimacy, and SDGs, and highlights the
mutually reinforcing nature of legitimacy and sustainability in sovereign
debt governance. Part III analyzes the theoretical means of deriving
legitimacy in sovereign debt governance. Part IV provides a concrete
example of how legitimacy may be assessed within the context of the
Principles. This article concludes by addressing some of the implications of
our conclusions on the SDGs.
5
Press Release, U.N.C.T.A.D., UNCTAD Releases Consolidated Principles on Responsible
Sovereign Financing, U.N. Press Release (Jan. 31, 2012), available at http://www.unctad.info/fr/DebtPortal/News-Archive/Our-News/UNCTAD-Releases-Consolidated-Principles-on-Responsible-SovereignFinancing-310112/.
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II.

THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN SOVEREIGN DEBT GOVERNANCE,
LEGITIMACY, AND SDGS

A.

Sovereign Debt and SDGs

Unsustainable debt burdens compromise the full enjoyment of human
rights, particularly economic, social, and cultural rights. 6 In the case of
sovereign insolvency, the development goals should be able to play a role in
promoting human rights by protecting the population against unacceptable
retrogressive measures and facilitating the economic conditions for
sustainable, inclusive growth.7
The post-2015 sustainable development agenda is currently being
drafted, so its final version has not yet been determined.8 However, it has
now been acknowledged that in contrast to the Millennium Development
Goals (“MDGs”), the SDGs should not repeat the mistake of failing to
differentiate between goals and financial measures required to fund those
goals (as happened with Goal 8 on the Global Partnership). The instruments
to be approved in the forthcoming Third International Conference on
Financing for Development should also facilitate the success of the future
SDGs.
The preparatory negotiations of this conference seem to indicate that
there is a growing consensus around the fact that unsustainable debts
threaten states’ efforts to fulfill their human rights obligations.9 One of the
proposed ideas is to “adhere to UNCTAD Principles on Responsible
Sovereign Lending and Borrowing.” 10 These principles, in addition to
similar guidelines promoting more responsible financial behaviors, would
shape global sovereign debt governance in the direction of ensuring
sustainable development.

6

See Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, Resolutions and Decisions on the
Mandate, UNITED NATIONS HUMAN RIGHTS (2014), http://www.ohchr.org/EN/Issues/Development/IEDebt
/Pages/Resolutions.aspx.
7
Kunibert Raffer, A Sovereign Debt Overhang, Human Rights and the MDGs: Legal Problems
Through an Economist’s Lens, in MAKING SOVEREIGN FINANCING AND HUMAN RIGHTS WORK 101 (Juan
Pablo Bohoslavsky & Jernej Letnar Černič, eds. 2014). See International development financing: “It’s not
just about more resources” – UN human rights expert, UNITED NATIONS HUMAN RIGHTS (May 26, 2015),
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=16004&LangID=E.
8
U.N. Economic and Social Council, Millennial Goals and Post-2015 Development Agenda,
http://www.un.org/en/ecosoc/about/mdg.shtml.
9
Rep. of Intergovernmental Comm. of Experts on Sustainable Dev. Fin., U.N. Doc. A/Conf.216/16,
chapter 1, resolution 1 (Aug. 2014).
10
U.N. Dept. of Economic and Social Affairs, Preparatory Process for the Third International
Conference on Financing for Development, Annex E (Jan. 21, 2015).
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Why Legitimacy in Sovereign Debt Governance?

Legitimacy is frequently treated as a side question—one only
concerning to scholars, which should not interfere with the economic and
financial considerations constituting the core of sovereign debt transactions.
Legitimacy is a term that has been historically excluded from the vocabulary
of sovereign debt restructurings because of a lack of legal grounding. The
legal and banking professions have a particular dislike for legitimacy
questions because legitimacy is conceptual, not codified, and therefore
unpredictable. The sovereign debt arena is predominantly occupied by actors
who dislike legitimacy questions, and are also generally satisfied with the
status quo.
This conservative attitude is characterized by the weight of events and
destructive patterns brought along with increased financial globalization.
The eurozone debt crisis, the vulture fund litigation against African countries
eroding the fiscal space generated under the Heavily Indebted Poor
Countries (“HIPC”) Initiative, and the recent Argentine litigation saga 11
highlight a few marking episodes of sovereign debt governance issues,
which require adequate—and thus legitimate—international regulation.
One important development contributing to moving the lines of normmaking in this area is the impact of individuals’ expectations and voices
across nations (mostly though their governments and interest groups) asking
for legitimate governance in sovereign debt. As Professor Robert Howse
points out, “sovereign debt crises are now a matter of intense public
contestation and debate. It is no longer a negotiation among small group of
elite actors, governmental and private sector managers, lawyers, and
international financial institutions’ officials where the broader social
consequences are marginalized and the solutions regarded as technical.”12
The media interest generated by these issues is directly linked to the threat of
a vanishing welfare-state, which constitutes the incarnation of protection at
the national level.13 Social aspirations therefore appear to be a key point in
the growing claims not only for nations that are currently facing massive

11

NML Capital v. Republic of Argentina, 17 N.Y.3d 250 (2011).
Robert Howse, Concluding Remarks in Light of International Law, in Sovereign Financing and
International Law: UNCTAD PRINCIPLES ON RESPONSIBLE SOVEREIGN LENDING AND BORROWING (Carlos
Espósito, Yuefen Li, & Juan Pablo Bohoslavsky, eds. 2013).
13
FRANÇOIS EWALD, L’ETAT PROVIDENCE 2 (1986).
12
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budget cuts but also for those fighting to make basic rights (e.g., access to
education for all) a reality.
From a structural perspective, the demand for legitimacy in sovereign
debt governance is directly linked with the flexibility and informality that
seems to be required in rapidly evolving and increasingly complex fields
such as the global financial sector. The recent attempt of the Group of 77
(“G-77”) to promote the creation of a multilateral framework for debt
restructuring processes through a U.N. General Assembly Resolution14 have
created tensions between developed and developing countries, highlighting
once again the challenge generated by the idea of formulating international
formal law in this field. The current governance of sovereign debt indeed
reflects this challenge. Some examples of international financial entities
include the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, UNCTAD, and
the Paris Club—all institutions concerned with sovereign debt governance
and constituted through international law—govern through informal means,
including guidelines, informal discussions, and official deliberations (e.g.,
U.N. General Assembly).15 This is not to mention purely ad-hoc governing
institutions such as the Group of 7 (“G7”) and Group of Twenty (“G20”),
known to be some of the most important fora for decision-making and
regulation on financial governance issues (though not specifically on
sovereign debt). Most instruments governing sovereign debt at the global
level are produced by informal international means and are considered soft
law;16 the relevance of their legitimacy is paramount but not only in relation
to their theoretical grounding. Legitimate laws exert a compliance pull 17
compelling states to implement policies in line with the public interest. 18
This in turn affects people who tend to be more honest when they are
reminded of the morality of their actions.19 Informal law is taken seriously if
it is persuasive enough to influence the behavior of the involved
stakeholders, affect the interpretation, application, and development of other
rules of law, or become recognized as a legal rule.

14

G.A. Res 68/304, U.N. Doc A/Res 68/304 (Sept. 14, 2014).
See Chris Brummer, Why Soft Law Dominates International Finance - And Not Trade, 13 J. INT’L
ECON. L., 623 (2010).
16
Jean D’Aspremont, Softness in International Law: A Self-Serving Quest for New Legal Materials,
19 Eur. J. Int’l L. 1075, 1075-76 (2008).
17
Andrew T. Guzman, A Compliance-Based Theory of International Law, 90 CALIF. L. REV. 1823,
1832 (2002).
18
Oona A. Hathaway, Between Power and Principle: An Integrated Theory of International Law, 72
U. CHI. L. REV. 469, 482-83 (2005).
19
DAN ARIELY, PREDICTABLY IRRATIONAL: THE HIDDEN FORCES THAT SHAPE OUR DECISIONS 231
(2010).
15
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The fact that sovereign debt contracts constitute the preferred means
of regulating sovereign debt transactions does not take away the political
component of such transactions, nor the necessity of having legitimate rules
or principles guiding sovereign debt practices at the international level.
C.

Legitimacy and SDGs

This article makes an explicit link between the need to give a greater
consideration to legitimacy issues in the context of sovereign debt
governance and the SDGs. In this respect, a few remarks should be made.
First, legitimacy is not inherent in sustainability; not everything that is
sustainable is legitimate and vice versa. Second, SDGs constitute an
objective, not a norm. Thus, the analysis that is undertaken in this article
does not apply to these goals as such but rather focuses on the legal
instruments to achieve them. Therefore, this article addresses the legitimacy
of norms in the international sovereign debt field that should be desirable or
functional for the purpose of implementing SDGs.
Third, while
sustainability constitutes an important financial dimension of what needs to
be achieved in terms of development, SDGs cannot be reduced to the
concept of sustainability alone. The SDGs embody a global will and spirit
to embrace a common path that puts the well-being of individuals in
harmony with their environment and avoids self-destructive patterns. This
spirit can be associated with legitimate procedures and outcomes, which, as
argued here, in turn constitute the defining components of legitimate
informal norms at the international level. The outcome orientation of
informal norms in sovereign debt governance is likely to make SDGs more
attainable. More compelling and efficient norms should make a difference
to achieve development goals.
III.

LEGITIMACY IN SOVEREIGN DEBT GOVERNANCE

A.

Sources of Legitimacy and Sovereign Debt Governance

The increasing demand for legitimacy in sovereign debt governance
runs parallel to the evolution of international law. 20 The increasing
production of informal norms at the international level is directly associated
with the need to protect both the sovereignty of sovereign borrowers and to
20
MICHAEL WAIBEL, SOVEREIGN DEFAULTS BEFORE INTERNATIONAL COURTS AND TRIBUNALS 170206 (2013) (Waibel points out the difficulty that sovereign creditors face in obtaining protection under
international law).
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adapt to the fast changing terms of debt contracts in line with market
evolutions.
The sources of legitimacy in international law are also shifting
because of the proliferation of these informal norms. This field has indeed
witnessed an increase of scholarship about the sources of authority and
normative means affecting behaviors at all levels of society. 21 Scholars have
attempted to describe this shift in many ways. Professor Anne-Marie
Slaughter talked about the emergence of sub-national cross border networks
of authorities (including diplomats, judges, legislators, etc.) that enable the
creation of norms amongst these networks to form global governance.22 In
the mid-2000s, legal scholars began questioning the sources of international
law in an attempt to open them to more informal normative undertakings,
thereby finally attempting to mirror the undergoing social evolution.23 Such
transformation brought along an additional way of legitimizing international
normative undertakings in the form of ex-post assessment.24
Building on this research, this section seeks to provide more insight
into the sources of legitimacy in the field of sovereign debt, which is
characterized by informal norm-making. This task involves assessing the
role of formal international law within the field of sovereign debt to clarify
whether the sources of legitimacy embedded in traditional sources of
international law do not also apply to this field. If this hypothesis is verified,
it is worth inquiring whether informal lawmaking can borrow from formal
lawmaking processes in the creation of its own means of legitimization.
1.

Formal Law and Consent-Based Legitimacy

The rules characterizing formal international law, and from which
legitimacy is derived, are well known: the Vienna Convention, customary
international law, and the general principles of international law. The rules,
requiring express and explicit consent are (mostly) stated in the Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties. However, these have a limited
significance.
Since international normative initiatives, especially in
financial governance, tend to manifest in the absence of formal agreement

21

See, e.g., JOHN BRAITHWAITE & PETER DRAHOS, GLOBAL BUSINESS REGULATION (2000).
See ANNE-MARIE SLAUGHTER, A NEW WORLD ORDER (2005).
23
JOSÉ E ALVAREZ, INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AS LAW-MAKERS 586-650 (2006).
24
Nico Krisch, Liquid Authority: Institutions, Law, and Legitimacy in Global Governance,
Dasturzada Dr Jal Pavry Memorial Lecture in International Relations, Oxford University (2012) (audio
recording available at http://www.politics.ox.ac.uk/podcast-series/2012-dasturzada-dr-jal-pavry-memoriallecture-in-international-relations.html).
22
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between parties, 25 contractual standards are not applicable. Formal
international law can also materialize in the form of customary international
law and general principles of international law. These strands of law have
their own legitimizing standards, although they differ on the matter of
consent manifestation.
Customary international law is derived from state practices and the
legal belief that these are consistent with the law.26 In practice, this entails
determining whether a practice constitutes generally accepted law, and then
ascertaining whether there is consistency with that law. The key issue
implicated with identifying legitimizing instruments is that the criteria used
to identify these practices are problematic and subject to debate. This is
indeed one of the most controversial issues among international law
scholars, who are trying to determine whether such criteria should be
backward-looking or forward-looking, and whether opinio juris is even
necessary for the enactment of customary law independent from state
practices.27 In addition to this problem, the lack of recognized state practices
in the field of sovereign debt governance makes the examination of
customary law legitimizing standards particularly complex. 28
The creation of general principles of international law29 relies mainly
on legal comparison and judicial application of domestic rules, with an
inherent universal logic deemed to go beyond cultural disparities. The
approach used is analytical and has to take into account the rationale behind
the way domestic law responds to a particular problem. This requires an
intrinsic evaluation of the principles founded in domestic systems that
provide the best solution for the case, rather than a mechanical or statistical
search of predominant rules.30 General principles of international law can
sometimes rely on judicial decisions, which are considered secondary
sources. Even in this context, it is worth noting that case law in the debt
area is rather limited, mixed, and sometimes contradictory.31
Not only is formal law not easily applicable to the issues that emerge
in sovereign debt governance, but also the elements necessary to create such
law are too sporadic to claim its existence on a consistent basis. Thus
25

Brummer, supra note 15, at 630.
Mitu Gulati, How Do Courts Find International Custom? (May 30, 2013) (unpublished
manuscript) (on file with authors).
27
See generally 21 Duke J. Comp. & Int’l L. 1 (2010) (special issue discussing debate); Symposium,
The Role of Opinio Juris in Customary International Law, Duke-Geneva Institute in Transnational Law
(July 12-13, 2013).
28
See WAIBEL, supra note 20.
29
See Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice.
30
TAKIS TRIDIMAS, THE GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF EU LAW 38 (2d ed.1999).
31
See WAIBEL, supra note 20.
26
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informal law in sovereign debt governance is both necessary and potentially
legitimate. There is a possibility that informal law may borrow from
legitimate sources found in formal law's creative processes such as
systematic observation of domestic practices and rules, legal comparison,
and abstract transposition into principles.
2.

Informal Law and Other Sources of Legitimacy

Beyond consent, the sources of legitimacy in international law can be
ex-ante for procedural or input legitimacy (e.g., transparency, participation,
representation) and ex-post for substantive legitimacy (e.g., results of
governance and sustainability, respect for equity, human rights, etc.). Both
are subject to public perceptions, also called the sociological dimension of
legitimacy. 32 This dimension is discussed here through examples of how
stakeholders received the Principles.33
The differences in using legitimizing sources for formal and informal
law must to be acknowledged. In the case of formal law, the comparative
methodology is applied in a judicial context involving a specific
institutionalized channel with means of enforcement. In the case of informal
law, however, this happens in an informal context that mostly involves
experts relying on their knowledge of domestic practices and their beliefs as
to what the law should be like for the common good. 34 The deliberation
process is thus fed by this knowledge and belief. Hence, without conferring
upon them a law-making role, experts and scholars are of crucial importance
in the creation of informal law. In some cases, informal law can also be
strengthened by a consistent legal effort to show how its rules are being
implemented on a systematic basis at the domestic level. This effort
constitutes an important enhancer of informal law’s legitimacy without being
essential to its creation, which is unlike formal law when embodied in
general principles. Indeed, the effectiveness of soft law is translated, expost, through the exemplification of implementation. Here too, the
deliberation process is enabled by and gains value through this systematic
legal approach, which grounds discussions into reality. Comparable
methodological traits can thus be used in different ways to foster the
32
See Daniel Bodansky, Legitimacy in International Law and International Relations (Aug. 1, 2011),
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1900289 (identifies normative and
sociological legitimacy).
33
See infra Part IV.
34
Incidentally, reliance on knowledge of state practices and belief that what is suggested
(normatively) is in the common good i.e. respects the intent of the law, recalls the criteria used by lawyers
to determine customary law. See Krisch, supra note 24.
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legitimate process of international law’s creation both on formal and
informal planes. In the case of informal law, the consideration of domestic
rules filters through expertise, deliberation, and effectiveness. As Professor
Anne Peters stated, “scientific legitimacy is not sufficient for the exercise of
public authority”; norms need to be socially necessary as reflected not only
by the participation of the affected people but also by the effectiveness of
these norms, also known as the substantive aspect.35
Due to the scarcity of formal legal sources specifically applicable to
debt issues and the negative effect of debt problems on the provision of
global public goods, this article mainly draws on the International Public
Authority theory.
This theory focuses on international normative
undertakings having a public effect and thus being receptive to politics of
de-formalization of international law.36 This choice translates an attempt to
be sufficiently flexible and broad to cover the actions and consequences that
are relevant in the study of norm legitimacy in sovereign debt governance.37
In the context of such theory and based on normative properties, three
elements can be used to assess the procedural legitimacy of exercises of
international public authority: a) expertise and knowledge that feed the
informal law instrument; b) intensive deliberation around the existence,
contents, scope, and goal of the principles; and c) the degree of effectiveness
of the principles (grounded in domestic sources). 38 Other sociological
elements are based on public perception and rely on perceived participatory
quality and effectiveness. Relying on perceptions, the latter elements are at
the crossroad between procedural and substantive legitimacy.
As to substantive aspects of norm-making legitimacy, we need to turn
to the purpose of the law in order to assess the effectiveness, efficiency, and
sustainability of the norm at stake. In doing so, we run into questions of
morality, ethics, and objectives such as fairness, justice, and the public
interest. Such objectives are then translated into policies and norms, which
are likely to have an impact on subjects.39 Legitimate international norms
are those which not only have such impact, but also create the conditions of
efficient policy outcomes in relation to the objectives. Such objectives are
ideals embodying the general interest. It is thus in their nature to be general
35

Anne Peters, Realizing Utopia as a Scholarly Endeavour, 24 EUR. J. INT'L L. 533, 539 (2013).
Armin Von Bogdandy, Philipp Dann & Matthias Goldmann, Developing the Publicness of Public
International Law: Towards a Legal Framework for Global Governance Activities, 9 GER. L. J. 1375, 1386
(2008), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=1348809.
37
Other standards used in the assessment of legitimacy tend to refer to institutions (e.g.
accountability) and are not applicable here.
38
Helen Keller, Codes of Conduct and Their Implementation: The Question of Legitimacy, in 194
LEGITIMACY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 219, 266-270 (Rüdiger Wolfrum & Volker Röben eds., 2008).
39
See generally JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (2005).
36
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and subject to interpretation. Deciding on the objectives or ideals against
which to assess normative undertakings is the first step in evaluating
substantive legitimacy.
A basic—but important—objective is to acknowledge an outcome
orientation governing sovereign debt contracting, which requires that
sovereign actions (such as borrowing and lending) be in citizens’ interest.40
This idea is based on a notion of sovereignty intrinsically linked to human
rights41 and the erga omnes (rights or obligations owed towards all) effect of
human rights obligations so that the impact of sovereign debt over states’
capacities to promote and protect human rights is not something (legally)
unfamiliar to lenders.
Paying increasing attention to human rights should have spillover
effects on sovereign debt standards, development goals, and the means to
achieve them. Sovereign financing is crucial for promoting and protecting
citizens’ human rights, the link between sovereign debt and human rights
becomes relevant and potent in terms of legitimacy. 42 This seems to be
corroborated by the fact that in 2012 the United Nations Human Rights
Council endorsed the Guiding Principles on Foreign Debt and Human
Rights.43
Jus cogens norms44 are recognized as those prevailing over all others
and as such, could theoretically be used as objectives.45 The issue here is
that these norms are in constant evolution and there is no consensus on what
they encapsulate.46 Moreover, with the only exception of situations in which
an authoritarian government engaged in a systematic campaign of human
40
See ODETTE LIENAU, RETHINKING SOVEREIGN DEBT: POLITICS, REPUTATION, AND LEGITIMACY IN
MODERN FINANCE (2014); see also Anne Peters, Humanity as A&O of Sovereignty, 20 EUR. J. INT'L L. 513,
524 (2009).
41
W. Michael Reisman, Sovereignty and Human Rights in Contemporary International Law, 84 AM.
J. INT’L L. 866, 875 (1990).
42
See U.N. Office of the High Commission for Human Rights, Towards a Multilateral Legal
Framework for Debt Restructuring: Six Human Rights Benchmarks States Should Consider (Jan. 25, 2015),
available at http://www.ohchr.org/EN/Issues/Development/IEDebt/Pages/ViewsIEConventiontoregulate
debt.aspx
43
Human Rights Council Res. 20/10, Rep. of the Human Rights Council, 20 th Sess., (June 18-July 6,
2012), A/HRC/RES 20/0 (July 18, 2012).
44
Jus cogens norms transform primordial social values into legal imperatives through judicial
determination. See Carnegie Endowment for International Peace “The Concept of Jus Cogens in
International Law” Lagonissi Conference: Papers and Proceedings (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie
Endowment for International Peace, 1967): 11.
45
Vienna Convention of the Law of Treaties art. 53, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331 (A treaty
between two states is void if it is in conflict with peremptory norms. Given the universal applicability of
jus cogens norms, this principle is indeed not limited to treaties but it also applies to contracts between
states and privates).
46
See Mary Ellen O’Connell, Jus Cogens: International Law’s Higher Ethical Norms, The Role of
Ethics in International Law 89 (Donald Earl Childress III ed., 2011).
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rights abuses is supported financially, jus cogens standards are not applied to
debt standards because they are not relevant in the context of sovereign debt
governance. Instead, international human rights law seems to offer a
broader and more skillful set of substantive criteria against which
substantive legitimacy may be assessed, 47 as suggested by the United
Nations Human Rights Council in 201148 and 2012.49 The recent Maastricht
Principles on Extraterritorial Obligations of States in the Area of Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights seem to corroborate this view.
In order to gain normative efficiency, the first step of identifying
quantifiable objectives needs to be complemented by a second step entailing
some form of monitoring. With legitimacy, for good or bad reasons,
contestation seems to be the most significant form of monitoring. 50
Perceived illegitimacy is indeed a strong catalyst for change through popular
contestation. Still, contestation often is a response to the implementation of
a policy translated into a norm as opposed to a response to the norm itself.
In monitoring the concerned norms, attention should be devoted to assessing
not only their effectiveness, but also their sustainability.
IV.

ASSESSING THE PRINCIPLES ON RESPONSIBLE SOVEREIGN LENDING AND
BORROWING

A.

Legitimacy Through Expertise, Stakeholders’ Participation, and
Deliberation

This section examines whether the Principles on Responsible
Sovereign Lending and Borrowing comply with the selected elements of
international legitimacy. As far as input legitimacy is concerned, let us
examine expertise, stakeholder participation, and deliberation one by one.
The level of expertise required in the formulation of the Principles
constituted a fundamental pillar of this normative undertaking. The
Principles have been drafted by an expert group of highly regarded
professionals in this field. 51 Legal and economic minds coming from
reputed universities and private law firms in the field of sovereign debt
restructuring were particularly active in the drafting process. Experts relied
47
48

BOGDANDI ET AL., supra note 31.
See Human Rights Council Res. 17/4, 17th Sess. May 30-June 17 2011, A/HRC/RES/17/4 (July 6,

2011).
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See Human Rights Council Res. 20/10, Rep. of the Human Rights Council, 20th Sess., June 18July 6, 2012, A/HRC/20/L.17 (July 22, 2012).
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Christian Reus-Smit, International Crises of Legitimacy, 44 INT'L POL. 157, 159 (2007).
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both on their scientific and theoretical knowledge, and their professional
experience relating to sovereign debt contracting practices all over the
world. The participation of the IMF, the World Bank, and the Paris Club as
observers meant that the articulation of concepts—and ultimately,
principles—going into the draft was always kept in check with the reality
and experience of lending practices at the multilateral and bilateral levels.
Expertise was communicated through regular face-to-face meetings and
through rounds of written comments, thereby offering prepared thoughts in
addition to the spontaneous remarks made during meetings.
In terms of participation in the drafting process, the members of this
expert group were carefully selected to reflect all the parties affected by
sovereign lending and borrowing and to be as inclusive as possible. The
idea behind this selection process was to combine the wide-ranging views of
all the stakeholders involved and potentially impacted by irresponsible
sovereign debt governance. Given the importance of basic taxpayers’
interests in this issue, members of international civil society were adequately
represented. In fact, Afrodad, Eurodad, Latindad, Jubilee Network,
Erlassjahr, and Slug were all invited to be part of the expert group. Private
interests were also heard through bond markets associations’ representatives
(International Capital Market Association and EMTA) and private lawyers.
Giving a voice to such disparate stakeholders could theoretically have
prevented any kind of consensus on the formulation of the Principles.
However, faced with the urgency to deal with the absence of universal
principles in the field and with the opportunity to address different ideas
with other stakeholders’ realities, participants engaged in meaningful
discussions rooted in mutual tolerance.
As to the process through which the Principles received support, the
adopted formula was deliberation based on extensive consultation. The
consensus building process began with the drafting exercise among the
members of the expert group meeting in which they exposed the points to be
addressed in the principles. Based on these points, the secretariat elaborated
a draft of the Principles. During 2011 and 2012, six regional consultative
meetings with countries took place in Buenos Aires, Bangkok, Luanda,
Geneva, Jeddah, and Punta Cana in order to get governmental feedback from
U.N. member states on the design and the possible implementation process.
Around seventy-five countries provided their views. After a series of
bilateral and high level regional governmental consultations and subsequent
refinements introduced by the project’s Expert Group, the consolidated
version of the Principles was launched in Doha in April 2012 on the
occasion of UNCTAD XIII, inaugurating the phase of endorsement and
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implementation. To date, twelve countries have explicitly endorsed the
Principles.
Deliberation thus took place through several means. First, once
launched into the public sphere, all delegations were informed and given the
opportunity to reply and comment on the Principles.52 Second, in regional
consultative meetings, the U.N. Secretariat took an active approach in
collecting the national views of those engaged in the borrowing and lending
of sovereign funds. Third, on several occasions the Principles were
discussed in open fora (inter alia General Assembly meetings, central
bankers meetings, general auditors’ meetings, parliamentary conference, and
debt managers conference) where participants were given the opportunity to
speak for or against them. Members of the civil society were not shy in
voicing their concerns, particularly on the question of illegitimate debts.
The fact that stakeholders with different, and sometimes contradictory,
interests openly debated problems and possible remedies not only improved
the information available,53 but also forced them to debate and argue their
positions and look for feasible and balanced criteria to be accepted. 54
Deliberation 55 also potentially generated new ways to advance the
stakeholders’ goals through cooperation.56
B.

Legitimacy Through Explicit and Implicit Consent

The idea of consent was not disregarded in formulating the Principles.
Its significance remains important in two respects. First, most of the
Principles can be considered as general principles of international law. 57
Apart from the similarities between private and state insolvencies,58 there is
a growing and broadening tendency to systematize principles distilled from
domestic legal systems (especially taking Chapters 9 and 11 of the U.S.
Bankruptcy Code as models) in order to build a new sovereign insolvency
architecture.
The notable similarities in domestic bankruptcy laws
52
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Peter M. Haas & Ernst B. Haas, Learning to Learn: Improving International Governance, 1
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facilitated the work to create the Southern Debt Restructuring Mechanism
(“SDRM”) proposed by the IMF in 2003, since, the standstill and approval
of the reorganization plan are deeply-rooted institutions in domestic law. A
broad comparative survey that includes fifteen representative jurisdictions59
indicates that while most of the Principles already can be regarded as general
principles of law, the rest can be categorized as guiding, emerging or
structural principles.60 In this sense, the creation of general principles of law
through the transposition of widely shared domestic practices into the
international legal context infers a degree of implicit consent.61
Second, consent constitutes an essential means of making the
Principles “implementable.” States’ official declarations of support for the
Principles (“endorsement”) is crucial for their influence in the international
arena. This is not because it would make them necessarily binding but
because States’ communication reflects their credibility and legitimacy on
the international scene as well as on the domestic one. Consent does not
work here as a legal instrument but as a political device belonging to
reputational games that carry the weight of individuals’ and citizens’ scrutiny
and tremendous potential for impact.
C.

Legitimacy Through Substantive Outcomes

Substantive legitimacy in the field of sovereign debt is strongly
connected to objective ideals of justice, fairness, and human rights. These
ideals are all essential elements in the determination of substantive policy
outcomes. These outcomes are the product of multiple outputs generated at
various levels of the policy arena. At the macro level, policy makers
consider theoretical approaches and ethical values to be assessed in the
interpretation of general principles such as those included in constitutional
laws, international conventions, or informal norms like the Principles. At
the micro level, which entails looking at each individual principle in the
sovereign debt area, outcomes are measured against results (outputs) that
should stem from the realization of the purpose and intent of such principles.
Finally, at the meso level, outcomes are determined by the behavior (output)
of the institutions and stakeholders in the pursuit of more responsible
sovereign financing practices. Naturally, all these outputs are a measure of
59
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efficiency, and efficient outcomes are an important component of sustainable
goals.
Hence, beginning with the macro perspective, given the direct and
positive impact that more responsible financial behaviors would have on
economic growth and, consequently, on achieving the development goals,62
the Principles can be viewed as generally functional and even as socially
necessary.63
From a micro perspective, the Principles purport to achieve general
ethical goals through specific legal means. First, lenders and borrowers
should acknowledge the duty of government officials to protect public
interest (of both the state and its citizens) (Principles 1 and 8). Second,
Principle 6 establishes that lenders must not participate in transactions that
violate, evade, or hamper U.N. sanctions. While this principle may seem
obvious considering other international law norms, political and academic
discussion on whether multilateral financial organizations are bound by the
U.N. Security Council resolutions.64 Third, Principle 9 (a general principle
of law) established that debts should be honored, unless the economic
circumstances of the borrower prevents full or timely repayment, or if a
judicial authority acknowledges a legal defense. 65 In case a debt
restructuring is unavoidable, this should be proportional to the sovereign’s
need and all stakeholders (including citizens) should share an equitable
burden of adjustment or losses.66
Other principles insist on the consideration of a large range of
implications, beyond the purely economic concerns of the creditors and
debtors in debt transactions. For instance, when assessing project financing
options, both lenders and borrowers should perform an ex ante and ex post
investigation of the likely effects of the project, including its financial,
operational, civil, social, cultural, and environmental implications. 67
Another example lies in Principle 14, where it is stipulated that while
62
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weighing costs and benefits of seeking sovereign loans, governments should
consider if it would permit additional public or private investment, with a
prospective social return at least equal to the likely interest rate. These
calculations should be performed after internalizing relevant social and
environmental costs and benefits. Because of its broad externalities,
particularly for taxpayers, the process for obtaining financing and assuming
sovereign debt obligations and liabilities should be transparent.68
From a meso perspective, the Principles allocate responsibilities to
lenders and borrowers according to those who are best suited to take action
to prevent losses, seeking to approach the optimal liability. In addition, the
Principles reflect and reinforce the morality involved in each behavioral
change they promote. Fiduciary responsibilities are probably their best
example of this. As fair laws exert a compliance pull on states, the
Principles seem to have a great potential in terms of implementation. The
Principles could trigger a change in both values and interests of stakeholders
involved in sovereign financing. Hence, since the externalities of the
problems addressed by the Principles are reciprocal, successful cooperation
is more likely.69
Behavioral changes are subtle and engrained in the participatory
process of the Principles’ elaboration. It begins with the willingness of
certain stakeholders, who would not in theory be open to a dialogue on
certain aspects of sovereign debt transactions (e.g., creditors), to participate
in the discussions. Institutional responses of certain stakeholders—like that
of the Institute of International Finance—in deciding to revise its own
principles on sovereign debt, bear witness to the effective character of
deliberative processes.70 More generally, the mandate granted by the U.N.
General Assembly to work on responsible sovereign lending and borrowing
shows a widespread consensus of the international community on the
necessity to strengthen debt crisis prevention and management on a global
basis.71
Following the drafting process, the Principles took on a life of their
own, influencing behaviors independently from UNCTAD initiatives. First,
68
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twelve member states endorsed the Principles, thereby indicating a
willingness to be recognized as responsible borrowers and lenders at the
international level. Evolving attitudes with regard to the endorsement of
Principles was also noted at the G20 level. In 2013, under the Russian
presidency, the Principles found a revived interest, leading UNCTAD to
highlight the importance of having more countries recognize these Principles
as a guiding tool in their economic and financial policies. 72 The current
efforts aimed at having all U.N. member states politically endorse the
Principles through the Financing For Development (“FFD”) process bear
witness to the consistent political consideration of this evolution on the
international level.
Notwithstanding the political relevance of the endorsement process,
changing behaviors also need to be examined in light of implementing
initiatives. At this point, stakeholders have taken two major steps in this
direction at the international level. First, the International Organization of
Supreme Audit Institutions (“INTOSAI”) recently discussed the technical
aspects of incorporating the Principles into the international standards used
by Auditors General to audit their countries' public debt. 73 This project,
carried out by the INTOSAI Development Initiative (“IDI”) ensures that
Auditors General from various countries will be trained with a view to audit
sovereign debts in line with the Principles. As a precursor of the initiative,
Norway undertook an audit of developing countries’ debts to the country on
the basis of the Principles. 74 Second, a dissenting opinion in a recent
International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (“ICSID”)
arbitration decision on jurisdiction and admissibility mentioned the
UNCTAD Principles as relevant law when deciding a dispute on public
debt.75
In addition, the spread of ideas potentially has the ability to shape
what societies see as legitimate and acceptable. The U.N. can play a
72
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transcendental role in this particular regard. Specifically, the U.N. General
Assembly approved Resolution 68/304 in September 2014, establishing an
Ad Hoc Committee to elaborate a multilateral legal framework for sovereign
debt restructuring processes:
Stressing the importance of the Principles on Promoting
Responsible Sovereign Lending and Borrowing issued by the
United Nations Conference on Trade and Development on 4
May 2011, which aim to reduce the prevalence of sovereign
debt crises, prevent unsustainable debt situations, maintain
steady economic growth and help achieve the Millennium
Development Goals, encouraging to that end responsible
sovereign borrowing.76
UNCTAD is now the Secretariat of the Ad Hoc Committee established by
the General Assembly (Resolution 69/247, December 2014) to implement
Resolution 68/304.77
Change in political discourse constitutes one of the ways to detect
evolutions in legitimate perceptions. With the Principles, a number of
stakeholders started adopting the U.N. language in their work and sometimes
even in their advocacy, thereby helping to reframe the debate on sovereign
debt crisis prevention. Terms like “responsible sovereign lending and
borrowing” or “co-responsibility” clearly indicate an attempt to depart from
the traditional policies focused solely on the borrowing countries and
embrace the idea that lenders and borrowers are jointly responsible in the
debt transactions they conclude. The adoption of this idea in the U.N.
General Assembly Resolution on External Debt (in 2010) 78 was then
followed in other fora such as the ACP/EU trade negotiations79 and the InterParliamentarian Union. 80 Civil society representatives and scholars also
played a crucial role in the dissemination of this language81.
76
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The Principles have only been released for endorsement since April
2012 and, consequently, their potential for implementation has yet to be fully
realized. Like many policy and normative outputs, the initiating institution
rapidly becomes detached from its output for the benefit of a better
appropriation by the stakeholders in need of providing a direction or a
framework to their activities. In that respect, a study of changing lending
and borrowing practices would be useful to get a sense of the breadth and
financial sustainability of the Principles implementation. While it is difficult
to study how changing practices link directly with the Principles, monitoring
legitimacy perceptions constitutes a recognized way of indicating
substantive outcomes. In terms of assessing legitimacy of international
initiatives, this article provides for an illustration of why it is important to
separate the analysis of the institution’s (here, the U.N.) legitimacy in
issuing norms and the norms’ (here, the Principles) legitimacy itself.
V.

CONCLUSIONS

The Principles integrate both procedural and substantive requirements
of the norm making processes of informal law. While some of these
elements can also be associated with formal law’s legitimacy requirements,
the particular attention paid to substantive outcomes makes this
legitimization process informal-norm-specific. This is particularly important
given the need to consistently link the SDGs to adequate financial means.
Informal law in the field of sovereign debt desperately needs good results
that are development and human rights-oriented.
On the one hand, robust discussions around the Principles
strengthened their procedural legitimacy. Expertise, participation, and
deliberation promoted and facilitated balanced and feasible rules in the
concrete case of the Principles. On the other hand, genuine and qualified
discussions help identify and crystallize rules that find trade-offs among the
behavioral changes sought by these same rules. Making the Principles’
concrete applications visible and understandable from the very beginning
constitutes a useful way of providing public goods more effectively and
efficiently—and in line with the SDGs and human rights—consolidating
their legitimacy.
Legitimizing norms according to the above criteria is particularly
suited to the area of sovereign debt due to the difficulty to obtain explicit
inter-state consent in this field, as well as the number and power of non-state
actors involved in sovereign lending and borrowing transactions. This is in

634

WASHINGTON INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL

VOL. 24 NO. 3

fact reflected in the state of formulation of traditional sources of
international law in the field.
The draft General Assembly Resolution 68/34 initially submitted by
the G-77 and China proposed the adoption of a multilateral convention.
However, the text eventually adopted refers to efforts to establish not a
multilateral convention, but a legal framework, echoing the call for a soft
law approach. In terms of impact, the development implications of having
legitimate norms in sovereign debt governance matter. For instance, the
legitimacy of norms such as the Principles, which integrate (macro) financial
sustainability as a key variable of norm efficiency, can in turn foster SDGs in
a significant way. Indeed, by placing individuals at the center of decision
making processes, even indirectly through democratic means, and by
holding the global general interest as a key consideration in sovereign debt
dispute resolutions, the intensity of disasters linked with the repayment of
unsustainable debts or, more generally, with irresponsible lending and
borrowing may be reduced.
The Principles are based on a productive interplay between
constructivism and international legal theory. While conscious of the
political and economic constraints existing in the international financial
arena, the Principles do not dominate weak stakeholders so that they follow
the rules made by the most powerful. On the contrary, the Principles
reinforce sovereigns’ will by incorporating general principles already in
existence in domestic orders and to which thus implicitly consented. In
addition, their general principles status implies that the Principles have been
successfully tested at the domestic level, so that expectations from and
familiarity with the Principles can potentially facilitate their adaptation and
implementation at a global scale.

